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McDonough, James Lee William Tecumseh Sherman In the Service of my
Country: A Life. W.W. Norton & Company, $39.95 ISBN 9780393241570
The Continuing Relevance of William Sherman
When William Sherman was yet a cadet at West Point, he proudly declared
himself “in the service of my country” (161). James McDonough chronicles this
journey of service that brought Sherman from humble cadet to full general in
William Tecumseh Sherman: In the Service of My Country: A Life. Among the
more notable themes McDonough explores throughout the hefty work are
Sherman’s growth; his mastery of logistics, maneuver, and risk; and his
resiliency.
Harry Williams considered Sherman to be one of the North’s two most
outstanding examples of growth as a general. (Grant was the other.) Nearly each
chapter of McDonough’s narrative provides some example of this phenomenon.
It is easy to appreciate what Sherman became by understanding his formative
experiences.
Almost immediately after graduating from West Point, Sherman began
developing a “distrust of the American Political landscape” that McDonough
notes “hardened in the following months and years” (65). Sherman decided early
he wanted no part of politics, and he would never change. “Not even decades
later,” McDonough notes, “when he knew that he probably could be the nation’s
president if he so desired” (66). Instead, Sherman remained on the military side
of serving his country, rising to general-in-chief, but with the position, enduring
the “inevitable frustrations” of the “Washington political scene” (702).
Sherman is perhaps most widely associated in the common conscious with
the increasing tendency toward total war that developed during the Civil War.
McDonough traces the origins of Sherman’s experience with the concept to his
service during the Seminole War where he witnessed the efficiency of Colonel
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William Worth’s policy of raiding Seminole villages, burning their huts, and
destroying their corn. Sherman did not forget the tactic, and resurfaced the
concept “with a vengeance during the Civil War, at the expense of the
Confederacy” (69).
This experience in Florida was just one of Sherman’s pre-war postings in the
South. He also served four years at Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island outside
Charleston, South Carolina, the very birthplace of secession. On the eve of the
Civil War, he found himself as the superintendent of the Louisiana State
Seminary of Learning (the forerunner of Louisiana State University) and
watched as the South prepared for war. These experiences provided Sherman
with a valuable frame of reference about the Southern people and region, and he
put this knowledge to good effect. Of his most famous Civil War campaign,
Sherman reported, “I knew more of Georgia than the rebels did” (87).
Perhaps most significant in Sherman’s development was his ever-deepening
relationship with Ulysses Grant, which began during the Fort Donelson
Campaign (309). After the two beat back near defeat at Shiloh, criticism of
Grant’s unpreparedness on the first day of the battle brought Grant to the brink
of leaving the Army. Sherman encouraged Grant to stay, and in so doing,
“rendered a major service to his country” (327). He also took their relationship to
a new level of trust and respect, and the two generals would ultimately execute
the synchronized strategy that brought the Union victory.
After Shiloh, Sherman was plagued by Southern guerrillas that infested the
countryside around Memphis and throughout western Tennessee. He developed a
policy of “collective responsibility” that held “the whole neighborhood fully
responsible” whenever guerrillas attacked his troops (338). It was the same
concept that Sherman would practice as he swept across Georgia, explaining to
Henry Halleck that “we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people,
and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well
as their organized armies.”
When it came time for that famous march, Sherman divided his army into
two wings on separate routes. This configuration served Sherman well, allowing
him to keep the enemy guessing about the army’s destination, facilitate foraging,
and expand the swath of destruction. Sherman had experimented with the same
tactic on his Meridian Campaign after Vicksburg, and gained “firsthand
convincing evidence that he could lead an army through the heart of Rebel
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol19/iss1/9
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.19.1.14

2

Dougherty: William Tecumseh Sherman In The Service Of My Country: A Life

territory, living off the land with no supply line whatsoever, and the enemy could
not stop him” (454). Armed with this experience, Sherman replicated it in
Georgia on a much larger scale (562).
In addition to chronicling Sherman’s growth as a general, McDonough
reinforces the common assessment that Sherman’s genius lay in logistics and
maneuver. It was Sherman’s grasp of logistics that McDonough notes enabled
him “to supply his armies, as well as feed the thousands of animals those forces
required, while seizing and maintaining the offensive against the Rebel army.
The closer he drew to Atlanta, the longer grew his line of communications, and
the more impressive was this achievement” (325). Atlanta also proved
Sherman’s mastery of maneuver warfare. “Time and again,” McDonough
reports, “he successfully performed turning movements, enabling him to
maintain the offensive initiative, avoid the enemy’s strongpoints, exploit the
enemy’s vulnerability and largely determine the course of combat, thus
presenting his opponent the undesirable choice of retreating or accepting battle”
(549-550). McDonough cites Sherman’s expertise with logistics and maneuver
as “among the most significant reasons that he has long been more relevant than
other generals of the American Civil War” (550).
Sherman is also admired by modern day students of the military art for his
capacity to manage risk, and his marches deep into enemy territory such as the
Meridian and Atlanta Campaigns are obvious examples. McDonough does
service to this aspect of Sherman’s military genius by also noting the risk
Sherman handled in dealing with John Bell Hood’s move to Tennessee after the
Battle of Atlanta. Leaving George Thomas to deal with Hood, knowing that
Andrew Jackson Smith was speeding Union reinforcements to Nashville,
Sherman found the risk posed by Hood acceptable relative to the devastation
Sherman anticipated inflicting on the Confederate psyche during his march
across Georgia. Sherman, McDonough astutely observes, had become “a master
at calculating risks” (579).
McDonough also highlights Sherman’s resiliency. His pre-Civil War career
was “increasingly hard and, for the most part, unrewarding” (62). It included
service in California where he “never once engaged in combat, while his West
Point peers were winning military laurels in Mexico.” The experience,
McDonough notes, “proved keenly disappointing and even embarrassing to a
man of Sherman’s abilities, ambition and dedication to the armed services of his
country” (124-125). Sherman resigned from the army only to be part of a failed
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bank venture which included the loss of some $130,000 he had invested for his
army friends. Although the bank was not obligated to cover these losses,
Sherman took it upon himself to make good the losses—even though his own
investments were virtually depleted—in what McDonough calls “evidence of
both an extraordinary high personal ethical standard and, more, a deep sense of
military camaraderie” (213). Then of course there is Sherman’s failed command
in Kentucky that brought with it charges he was “crazy.” Sherman recovered
from this near disaster by “the proverbial godsend” of Fort Donelson that
McDonough writes put Sherman “back in the war in a big way” (308).
At 816 pages, William Tecumseh Sherman: In the Service of My Country: A
Life is not for the casual reader. Yet for one interested in exploring what
McDonough advertises in the title: the life of a man’s service to his country, it is
well worth the investment.
Kevin Dougherty is the Assistant Commandant for Leadership Programs at
The Citadel. His most recent book is The Port Royal Experiment: A Case Study
in Development(University Press of Mississippi, 2014) and his current project is
a collection of essays on nation-building to be published by McFarland in 2017.
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